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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis argues for the utility of interpreting Michel Foucault as a social
theorist. The first part of this thesis accomplishes an intellectual history of
Foucault's thought in reference to structuralism and poststructuralism in
20th century  France.  In  these  sections,  I  discuss  what  critical  and
methodological tools Foucault uses in his research and their similarity to
social  analysis.  I  compare  and  contrast  Michel  Foucault  with  Jurgen
Habermas to demonstrate the intertextuality of their work, specifically in
their theories of social technologies and power interests. The second part
of this thesis expands a viable poststructuralist social theory, based on two
of  Foucault's  concepts:  power-relations  and  subjectivities.  In  his
conception of  power,  Foucault  presents  systems analysis  as  compatible
with discursivities and resistances. Lastly, Foucault provides a new way to
analyze the subject and ethics in the domain of social theory.
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The Poststructuralist Social Theory of Michel Foucault:
Power-Relations and Subjectivities
I. Introduction
The thought of Michel Foucault is anomalous to the extent that it cannot be reduced to one
academic discipline. Sound, substantive arguments can be made for recognizing Foucault as a historian,
a philosopher, a literary critic, a psychologist, a political theorist, and a sociologist. This thesis will
focus on the latter identification: how does Foucault operate at the benefit of modern sociology and to
the  benefit  of  future  social  theory?  After  some  initial  remarks  about  Foucault's  philosophical
framework,  I  will  examine his life,  his  methodology, and his reception among other contemporary
social  theorists.  Adopting terms that  will  be explained later in this paper,  I  will demonstrate how
Foucault  presents  a  viable  poststructuralist  social  theory,  predominantly  consisting  of  two  critical
concepts: power-relations and subjectivity. 
Within the field of sociology, there is still  a large diversity of concentrations. What kind of
sociologist is Michel Foucault? Some significant resonances will be expanded upon between him and
historical  sociology,  political  sociology,  criminology,  activist  sociology,  and  even  the  sociology of
religion.  Understanding Foucault  through  these  angles  will  find  him to  be  a  timely companion  to
contemporary sociology and its  internal  conflicts,  especially the divide  between quantitative social
research on one hand, and theoretical-philosophical sociology on the other. In brief, Foucault's powers
of  application  match  his  powers  of  theoretical  analysis.  Through  a  quasi-philosophical  historical
method, used for the perennial but problematic project of understanding 'the present,'1 Foucault defines
sociology, and its critical procedures that produce knowledge, in a new and convincing way. 
Sociologists may very well be the first intellectuals to agree with Foucault that understanding
1 Foucault, “What Our Present Is,” The Politics of Truth, 2007, p. 131.
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'the present' is indeed problematic, because thinkers are always conditioned by a time period and a
culture; thought is not pure, not even mathematics,2 but relative to context and social institutions. The
same  is  undoubtedly true  of  sociology itself  as  a  group  of  knowledges  in  the  domain  of  human
sciences.  Here  is  the  Foucaultian  problem  or  paradox:  a  communication  about  one's  culture  is
articulated through one's culture.3 
The  logic  in  this  problem  is  quite  Kantian,  which  is  not  surprising  since  Foucault  often
identifies himself directly in the Kantian critical tradition. Stated in a different way, the paradox deals
with the modern analytic of reflexivity on various levels, whether self or society: we are limited by
what  conditions  us—sociolinguistics  has  this  two-fold  logic.  Understanding  the  present  is  an
impossible task, because we can never fully realize how saturated our intelligibility is with culturally
determined possibilities defined by the historical discourse we employ—the 'historical  a priori' that
establishes our constitutive limits. On the level of self, Foucault dismisses this 'analytic of finitude' as a
imminently disintegrating modern paradigm.4 But on the level of society, Foucault cannot escape or
find an alternative to the Kantian/critical logic, as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow duly note.5 Before
this is taken as an authoritative critique, readers of Foucault should note his explicit identification with
Kant. Not only did Foucault write his secondary dissertation on Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic
View,6 but  in  a  later  retrospective  article  of  self-description,  Foucault  promotes  his  work  as  a
continuation of the Kantian philosophical attitude.7
What does Kant have to do with Foucault's social theory? This question turns the discussion to
2 So Foucault asserts in Ethics: Truth and Subjectivity, 1997, p. 296.
3    Of course, Foucault would agree with other French historians, like Fernand Braudel or Michel de Certeau, who
problematize historical access to an unprejudiced past not affected by the cognitive interests of the present—so in a sense,
the paradox of articulating an 'ontology of the present' applies to how the past is read as well. We will see how this
complicates Foucault's method, since at the same time, Foucault attempts to chart historical discontinuities with an eye on
how they elucidate the present. The logic here sounds more like a Schleiermacher's hermeneutical circle. 
4 Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970, pp. 340-347.
5 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Hermeneutics and Structuralism, 1983, p. 32.
6 Foucault, “Introduction to Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” 2002.
7 Foucault, “Foucault,” 1984.
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an account of French intellectual thought in the mid-20th century, focusing on the movements that most
impacted  Foucault.  When Foucault  first  rocketed  to  academic  success  and worldwide  fame in  the
1960s, he was on board the ship called 'Structuralism.'8 As if to verify the tenets of structuralism, the
movement did not have a founder or master figure so much as a cross-disciplinary discourse which
many intellectuals appropriated or rejected. Initially, structuralism was deployed as a science; it was the
science  of  systems,  replacing  any  consciousness-centered  or  ego-oriented  philosophy,  namely
existentialism  (e.g. Sartre)  and  phenomenology  (e.g. Husserl).  In  linguistics,  Ferdinand  Saussure
explained  the operations  of  language  as  differential  relations  between  arbitrary sign  and  signified.
Claude Levi-Strauss, in anthropology, studied myths as a set of binary oppositions and applied the
Saussurian differential system to kinship relations. In psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan updated Freud by
identifying the unconscious with the structure of language. Similarly, Louis Althusser tried to update
Marx according to the tenets of scientific structuralism, scrapping Marx's  historical,  prophetic  side
while elevating his materialistic theory of economic determination and relations of production.  France
was a hotbed of monumental thinkers in the 20th century that the rest of the world is still trying to
absorb. Foucault's contemporaries also included influential thinkers in literature and philosophy, such
as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze.
Structuralism radically disturbed sociology but it also constructed new social theories. Rather
than comment on specific analysts though, a general account of the contours of a 'structuralist social
theory' will serve my purposes. Structuralism is said to have accomplished the disappearance of the
'subject'  and  the appearance of  the  'object'  as  a  product  of  discourse—today intellectual  historians
equate  structuralism  with  'the  linguistic  turn'  and  the  preference  for  synchronic  explanations  of
causality rather than diachronic or historical methods. What this means exactly must be elaborated in
8 Of course, Foucault only ever tenuously identified his thought with structuralism; later he denounced any association
completely. 
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reference to Foucault and other specific structuralist theorists.
Foucault's  thought  in  the  1960s  was  characteristic  and  consonant  with  the  structuralist
intellectual renovation. At that time, he was constructing his theories on discourse, discontinuity and
periodization.9 In fact, Foucault's early writings actually show a scarcity of social analysis—he is more
concerned with discourse and knowledge than with power-relations. However, what's significant for
social theory is the Foucaultian rejection of the humanist individual, a singular genius or hero who
gives birth to a meaningful world. This is where Foucault sharply diverges from the Kantian project:
Foucault decenters and dehabilitates the transcendental subjectivity of philosophical idealism and its
remnant in high historiography. The transcendental subject as constructor or even hermeneutic-reader
of history, to put it dramatically, is murdered by the machine. In this new paradigm, society's rules and
regularities, by language and law, effect the subject, not the other way around. Of course, subjects often
proceed  to  misinterpret  the  relation  between  truth  and  discourse  and  power,  as  when  they  make
conscious statements of meaning in a mythic world that revolves around 'Man.'  They forget  or are
blinded  to  the  fact  that  any intelligible  statement  merely is  an  already structured  possibility  of  a
epistemic  cultural  framework,  a  system  of  differences.  So  goes  the  structuralist  theory  of  the
unconscious.
This dark caricature of a 'structural social theory' is elucidated by the contrast with optimistic
humanism and hermeneutics. Yet, it must be recognized from the start that Foucault, in the 1970s until
his death in 1984, not only constantly dissociates himself from structuralism, as depicted above, but he
also vehemently criticizes such canonical structuralism.10
9 The Order of Things, pp. xxii-xxiii.
10 For one among numerous examples, see Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 1997, p. 176.
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II. Is Foucault a Sociologist?
Biography
An intellectual  biography  will  help  contextualize  Foucault's  thought  or  at  least  give  some
didactic ordering to it.11 
Foucault was born in 1926, and he reflects that his childhood was lived in the fear and rumors
of war.12 His father was a physician and his family afforded him a quality education. In high school,
Foucault  was  most  interested  in  the  study  of  history,  while  in  college,  his  specialty  shifted  to
psychology and psychiatry, in which he would later do his primary dissertation and write his first book.
Very ambitious, he was accepted on his second attempt into the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), one
of France's most competitive and prestigious universities. Moving to Paris for the ENS in 1945, he
attended lectures by Georges Dumezil, Jean Hyppolite, and the more famous Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
While working on his primary and secondary dissertations, he was advised by highly influential
intellectuals, most notably Louis Althusser and Georges Canguilhelm. The latter professor was also a
philosopher of psychology and was perhaps the most formative thinker upon Foucault's early work,
Mental  Illness  and  Psychology and  History  of  Madness.  The  former  book  Foucault  has  mostly
disowned, while the latter as his first famous work largely planted Foucault's name in the academic
media.  
Canguilhelm's  background  was  in  the  philosophy  of  science,  specifically  under  Gaston
Bachelard,  and  his  project  was to  trace  the  emergence  of  'concepts'  in  the formation  of  scientific
psychology. By 'concept,' Canguilhelm meant more than 'idea'; it is more akin to the social construction
of perception, how experts like doctors constitute reality through terms like 'mental illness' or even
11 There are three definitive biographies about Foucault, each one with a unique emphasis and angle such that it is not a
bore to read all three! Didier Eribon's Foucault, 1992; James Miller's more controversial The Passion of Michel
Foucault, 1994; David Macey's The Lives of Michel Foucault, 1993.
12 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, pp. 38-39.
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'dead.' The most significant concept Canguilhelm studied was 'the normal and the pathological' and
how norms of homeostasis and reason exclude the Other through a term, e.g. 'insane' or 'pathological.'
Yet Canguilhelm also posits that the Other, though separated and segregated by structural division, is a
necessary condition for operation of 'normal' or 'rational' discourse.13 Foucault obviously internalized
much of  Canguilhelm's  thought  in  his  History  of  Madness.  In  this  book,  Foucault  plots  changing
conceptions of 'madness,' especially its shift in perception from innocent folly to moral corruption or
biological malfunction. Historically, Foucault identifies the Enlightenment and the 'Great Confinement'
of  madness  as  two sides  of  the same coin. The philosophical  and geographical splitting between
Rationality and Irrationality constituted the Classical possibilities for both reason and madness under a
new set of designating and excluding definitions. Foucault's book is often discredited precisely for its
grandeur, so Jacques Derrida has critiqued: Foucault's lifelong tendency to make generalizations on the
basis of a few writers, in this case Descartes, is nowhere as glaring as it is with History of Madness.14 
The  other  confusion  arising  from  the  book  is  due  to  Foucault's  early  obsession  with  the
experience of madness. To some extent, Foucault not only defends madness but also advocates it as a
limit-experience. This is the controversial topic that has led to much biographical guesswork, especially
by James Miller, who sees the notion of 'limit-experience' as permeating Foucault's whole canon.15 This
guesswork could make sense of Foucault's suicidal and instable years in college, if the experience of
encountering death is interpreted as one such (im)possible limit-experience, which early Foucault does
seem to suggest. But it is vital to recognize that this discussion occurs in an advance, obscure arena of
philosophy, building upon predecessors like Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot who wrote that,
“the being of language is apparent to itself only in the disappearance of the subject.”16 In other words,
13 Georges Canguilhelm, The Normal and the Pathological, 1991.
14 This is also the critique of Edward Said who nevertheless was heavily influenced by Foucault; c. f. Said's essay,
“Foucault and the Imagination of Power,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, 1986.
15 James Miller, pp. 32, 87.
16 Eribon, p. 149.
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by the death of the self through its dispersion in language, a quasi-mystical experience that transgresses
the norm-limit is possible (whether of madness, of sexual rapture, or of dying). While Miller tends to
promote this as definitive Foucault,  David Halperin17 and other scholars have mostly disassembled
Miller's  depiction by observing how this  'limit-experience obsession'  is  only symptomatic of  early
Foucault. 
In later Foucault, many of these tropes occasionally resurface in interviews about the experience
of homosexuality in modern societies. In France in the mid-century, practicing homosexuality was not
exactly normal or pathological, though often considered 'transgressive' and even 'creative' relative to
the 'heterosexual hegemony.' An intellectual biography, that includes Foucault's later interviews, cannot
ignore that  Foucault practiced homosexuality for his whole life and died of AIDS in 1984. Hence,
James Miller's guesswork that many of Foucault's notorious troubled years of youth might have rightly
been  diagnosed  by  Foucault's  psychiatrist  in  1948  as  due  to  a  social  “difficulty  in  experiencing
homosexuality.”18
Early Foucault does continue to philosophize about death in his next two books, published in
the  same  year,  1963,  but  otherwise  the  two  are  unrelated.  In  Death  and  the  Labyrinth,  Foucault
exercises his talents as a literary critic by discussing the obscure poet Raymond Roussel who associates
the experience of writing with death. In The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception,
Foucault returns to the history of science to trace the conceptual appearance of death itself as an object
for  the  medical  mind  and  the  all-seeing  gaze  of  the  expert—an  anticipation  of  the  dual
power/knowledge complex. Foucault's thesis is that in the 18th century, a new conception of 'life' arose
with  biologists,  causing  a  massive  reconceptualization  of  the  body,  sickness,  and  death.  The
objectivation of biological life becomes important in Foucault's later theorizing about the modern bio-
17 David Halperin, Saint Foucault, 1997.
18 Eribon, p. 26.
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power of the nation-state.
In 1966, Foucault became an intellectual celebrity with the publication of The Order of Things
and its methodological defense three years later: The Archaeology of Knowledge. These two books are
the  zenith  of  Foucault's  unique  form  of  structuralism.  Basically  they  are  a  historical  exercise  in
discourse  analysis  of  three  epistemological  epochs  and  the  transformations  between  the  three:
Renaissance, Classical, and Modern. In 1970, Foucault was elected to be a professor at the famous
College de France, the paramount university for free-thinkers in France. He titled his own chair as
“History of the Systems of Thought.” 
At the College de France, Foucault was required to deliver a course of lectures on new research
once a year to the public. Many of these have now been published as books, and they are a formidable
source of Foucault's later thinking yet to be integrated in content with his intentionally-written books.19
The courses are also beneficial for locating his contributions to social theory, so I will mention a few of
them for this purpose. From 1971-73, Foucault lectured on penal theories and punitive society. These
lectures indicate Foucault's shifting method from discourse to  power analysis, and the explanation of
power as various social controls and mechanisms. Much of the content  of these two lectures were
eventually published in 1976 in Discipline and Punish, which is probably Foucault's most read book, at
least  by  Americans.  In  1975-6,  Foucault  presented  a  lecture  series  entitled,  “Society  Must  be
Defended.” In this course, Foucault directly challenges the claims of traditional political theory. He
critiques social contract philosophy and theories of legitimacy and sovereignty. Dismissing them as
ideological tools, Foucault traces a history of the modern nation-state, its emergence through war, and
the new form control over populations:  bio-power.  Two of Foucault's last lectures at the College de
France were titled, “Subjectivity and Truth,” and “The Hermeneutics of the Subject.” The return of a
19 One notable exception to this is Eric Paras's Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power/Knowledge, 2006. Paras's goal was precisely
to update Foucault by integrating the content of his courses at the College de France.
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usable concept of the 'subject' to Foucault's critical theory should be noted here as a poststructuralist
turn.
During the late 1960s and 70s, Foucault also became an icon of political activism and public
resistance to  governmental  power,  though Foucault  understood his participation in  protest  on very
different  grounds than the frequent Marxist  or  Maoist  in France during the 1968 revolts.  Foucault
founded an organization called the GIP, or Group d'Information sur les Prisons. The objective of this
group was to expose jail conditions and advocate prisoners to speak politically for themselves. In 1973,
Foucault translated and published a dossier of reports on a criminal case in 1836, including a round of
articles by various French thinkers.20 In the late 1970s, Foucault turned into an international journalist
for a year, covering the Iranian Revolution. From his activity at Tehran and elsewhere, a stream of
articles, interviews, and social commentaries poured from his pen about religion and political change.
In the early 1980s, Foucault teamed up with a famous French sociologist, Pierre Bordieu, to draft a
signed declaration of protest against the repressive policy of the communist government in Poland. All
of these events established Foucault's reputation as a social activist in addition to France's most popular
philosopher.
During  the  last  decade  of  his  life,  Foucault  was  often  traveling  abroad;  he  studied  Zen
Buddhism in Japan, gave lectures in Brazil, and taught seminar courses at the University at Berkeley in
California.  Around  this  time,  he  published  a  forgotten  suicidal  memoir  written  by  a  French
hermaphrodite.21 Foucault's  last  publication  venture  included  three  books  in  an  incomplete  project
Foucault started called The History of Sexuality. Volume 1, An Introduction, was published in 1978 as a
dense outline of the domain and methods for a future project that would trace the historic formation of
the modern heterosexual-family ethos and configuration of sexuality. Volumes 2 and 3, respectively
20 Foucault, I Pierre Riviere, 1975.
21 Foucault, Herculine Barbin, 1980.
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Uses of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, were not published until 6 years after the first volume. The
classicist content of these latter two volumes was a surprise to everyone including Foucault. He had
made the decision to begin his history of sexuality by studying Greco-Roman society, thus putting him
in a new conversation with classicist colleagues such as Pierre Hadot, Paul Veyne in France, and also
Peter Brown in the United States.  Foucault  died in a hospital  shortly after reading the first public
response of reviews to these two books.22 
Methodology
Foucault's reputation as a philosopher often leads sociologists to discriminate against him as
irrelevant to their study. I am arguing that this is a mistake and that there are good warrants for taking
him seriously as a theoretical sociologist. I am not interested in a game of academic ownership; rather, I
propose that evaluating Foucault as a sociologist is beneficial to both commentary on Foucault and the
field of sociology—opening both the person and the discipline to better interpretations. To demonstrate
Foucault's strengths for social theory, I will enter a methodological discussion.
Does Foucault have a 'method'? Perhaps the benefit of studying Foucault two decades after the
close of his oeuvre, is that he is finally being rescued or rather salvaged from his vituperative critics
who smear him as  either  a  simple structuralist  or  a  skeptical  postmodernist  who makes simpleton
statements,  like “truth is  power” says  one mantra often misattributed to him,  another  says  “power
determines people.” More careful commentary has lead most scholars to recognize the complexity of
Foucault's thought. His complexity comes from the fact that he does not have one method, nor does he
have an immobile core system or similar goal  behind every project  and publication.  Gary Gutting
skillfully investigates  this  same  question,  and  comes  to  the  conclusion that  Foucault  gravitates  to
different methods for each work written. Gutting claims Foucault often switches his methods dependent
22 Eribon.
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on the objects at hand, which makes sense since every 'object' that appears is defined by a certain
discourse that may be more vulnerable to some methods rather than others.23 The breadth and diversity
of Foucault's oeuvre is immense, as even my brief biography shows. 
However, Foucault should not be criticized as flippant in his methodology. On the contrary,
Foucault seems to be proving a point through his oeuvre's ostensible lack of systematic unity. The
modern notion of 'the author' includes a complex set of rules, including the truth-game of self-sameness
and  context-text  coherence.24 To  write  professionally  one  must  bind  one's  self  to  a  set  of  rules:
agreement with what one said before,  and coherence of  text  according to  the expectation of one's
context. This is the deadlock Foucault tries to break through, rather apocalyptically, when he announces
“the death of the author” along with Roland Barthes. In one book, Foucault might analyze written
documents produced by experts, e.g. The Birth of the Clinic; in another book, his investigations might
lead him to discuss architecture and social patterns of space,  e.g. Discipline and Punish; in his later
writings on Greco-Roman and Christian societies, Foucault adopts rather traditional methods, those of
intellectual history and contextualism. Foucault considers it a mark of intellectual maturity, and true
'curiosity,'  to not  be confined to one method according to conservative academic rules.  Indeed, he
writes that all research would be futile if it did not lead one to change one's mind against what one
thought they already knew.25
Unexpectedly,  Foucault in some recorded interviews of the 1980s, later offers his own self-
descriptive take on the coherence of his oeuvre. His self-commentary is undeniably retrospective but
still very instructive. The hermeneutical key to his texts turns out to be the disappeared-but-returned
subject which never really disappeared in the first place, Foucault argues. These interviews and their
content which shed light on the whole of Foucault's thought will be discussed at length in my last
23 Gary Gutting, “Introduction: Michel Foucault,” Cambridge Companion, 2005.
24 See Foucault's famous article, “The Death of the Author” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 1978.
25 Foucault, Preface to History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Uses of Pleasure, 1985, p.8. Also printed in Ethics, p. 205.
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section on Foucault's poststructuralist social theory. 
Even if Foucault exercises flexibility in choosing his methods differently in different projects,
there are still several characteristics that all of his books have in common. A good heuristic is the title
of Foucault's academic post at the College de France, “Chair of the History of Systems of Thought,”
which he coined himself. The first feature of this title to note is Foucault's historicism—insofar as he is
a sociologist, he is a historical sociologist. Foucault's biographers all state how Foucault could live in
the archives during the entire working day. Gilles Deleuze frankly calls Foucault an 'archivist' before a
'philosopher.'26 The  hyperboles  are  duly  called  for:  Foucault  lives  and  breathes  in  the  historical
documents of multiple archives of the best libraries in France. One's first impression when opening a
Foucault book may be the overwhelming presence of strange names, people important in their own
time, but archaic or forgotten today, many whom Foucault singles out for a discursive criticism that has
the effect  of  elevating their significance as revealing key symptoms of ephochal,  cross-continental
transformations.  For  instance,  appearing in  the  first  100  pages  of  The  Order  of  Things  are  Porta,
Croilius,  Cesalpino,  Belon,  Aldrovondi,  Paracelsus,  Ramus,  among  many  others.  Hence,  Deleuze
writes  that  Foucault  provides  us  with  an  alternative  archaeology  and  cartography  surrogated  for
belletristic or individual/event-centered historiography.27 
Foucault  'does  history'  for  objectives  that  coincide  with  sociologists:  i.  To  understand  the
present,  even  through  the  paradoxical  way  described  in  my  introduction;  ii. To  demonstrate  the
contingency  of  contemporary  configurations  of  power—this  historical  method  Foucault  calls
'genealogy'  in the spirit  of  Nietzsche;  iii. To expose the relativity of  certain  problematics  between
discourse and power that constitute objects and subjectivities. 
Foucault  achieves  this  last  objective  by  employing  explicitly  comparative  methods.  By
26 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 1986, p.1.
27 This locates Foucault with Fernand Braudel of the long duree or Annales school of history (vs. event-history).
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comparing different cultures and different periods, the historian gains a perspective on the emergence
and disappearances of 'objects,'  i.e. why certain cultures institute some social patterns as 'problems'
while other social patterns are neither detected nor observed—hence called 'cultural.' A typical example
Foucault  gives  of  this  social-fact  problematization  in  his  later  interviews  is  homosexuality.  First,
Foucault notices that homosexuality had not been a 'problem' until relatively recent. Sexual behaviors
between same-sex persons have occurred throughout history, yet in Greco-Roman culture, they took
place without being an 'object' of moral analysis. Then, Foucault asks why the shift in our modern
perception occurred. In attempting an answer, Foucault formulates the hypothesis that as the practice of
'male friendship,' as performed in antiquity and the middle ages, gradually disappeared, homosexuality
was  inverse-proportionately  problematized,28 It  thus  became  not  only  an  a  posteriori object  of
historical-social analysis, but primarily an epistemic-historical a priori social fact of society, a problem
to be dealt with by regulation, control, and surveillance—the mechanisms of juridical power. 
As another example of his comparative methodology, Foucault contrasts Eastern practices of
sexuality with Western practices in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Foucault describes the
Eastern conceptuality of sexuality as an  ars erotica:  sexual practice is a set of skills for enhancing
bodily pleasure to be moderated.29 In contrast, Western Christianity-derived culture conceptualizes and
enacts sexuality as a scientia sexulis: sexual behavior is seen as the secret truth of subjects according to
a confessional hermeneutic of desire.30 In the West, desire and truth constitute sex; in the East, sex is
the management of bodily pleasure. Of course, Foucault has been severely criticized for this simplistic
typology  that  roughly  misrepresents  eastern  cultures  in  their  diversity.  But  the  point  here  is  a
methodological one: Foucault's  comparative  analysis exposes the  objectivation or  problematization-
28 Ethics, p. 171: “I think the reason [homosexuality] as a problem, as a social issue, at this time is that friendship had
disappeared.”
29 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1: Introduction, 1978, pp. 67-70.
30 However in a later interview, Ethics p. 259, Foucault concedes that he was wrong about using the ars erotica as he did,
almost like an ideal-type.
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procedures of our present Western culture by contrasting specific social-facts and social-objects relative
to different  discourses. 
I  have  purposefully  deployed  Durkheim's  term  'social  fact'  even  though  Foucault  did  not.
Perhaps  most  social  theorists  would  recognize  the  similarity  of  conceptual  analysis  though.  No
secondary literature I have found connects Foucault to Durkheim directly.31 Its seems quite plausible
though, considering how influential Durkheim was upon French social theory, that Foucault read and
internalized Durkheim as he had Canguilhelm. That Foucault read Durkheim can easily be evidenced
by the occasional references to him, such as in Discipline and Punish.32 But even if Foucault did not
consider himself properly Durkheimian, his analysis exemplifies historical sociological methods in a
similar vein.
Sometimes Foucault  promotes the agenda of social  theory more consistently than practicing
sociologists.  The  topical  affinity  between  Foucault's  writings  and  social  theory  is  easily  evident:
deviance,  mental  illness,  sexual  behavior,  governmentality,  and  lastly,  how  the  self  is
constituted/socialized and conscious of itself. As for where and why Foucault often excels in social
analysis,  I  am  led  to  credit  his  critical  philosophy.  The  innovations  of  Foucault's  critical  method
exemplify the necessity of perpetuating dialogue between sociology and philosophy. From this bridge,
Foucault is able to penetrate the paradoxes of social analysis, mainly by not letting social theory be a
special exception to a rigorous discourse analysis.  Foucault's critical  analysis of all  modern human
sciences would lead social theorists to question the popular objects of social analysis, whether crime,
gender, race, class, etc. Why are they the privileged objects or objectified subjects? Is not their list a
new authoritative canon according to rules of the academic profession, research funding and teaching
reputation?  And has  not  the  sedimentation  of  those  objects  become so  saturated,  that  their  social
31 Even though Mike Gane comprehensively comments of them both in his French Social Theory, 2003.
32 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1977, p. 23.
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analysis often loses its usefulness—or at least that social analysts have lost the comparative creativity
to discover what other problematics are operative in the present,  which could be so close to us as
instruments of our perception that we cannot even see them? Would Foucault suggest that the very
focus  on  'social  problems'  is  conditioned  by  practices  no  longer  performed,  symbols  no  longer
circulated  except  on a  secondary historical  order?  These critical  questions  exemplify the value  of
Foucault for understanding the present. Furthermore, many social theorists and anthropologists of the
'everyday' already do research and analysis similarly to a Foucaultian geneaology of the present. 
Returning to a discussion of Foucault's  methods, they are often classified into two types:  i.
archaeology, and ii. genealogy. Early Foucault of the 1960s exclusively used an archaeological analysis
that resonated with the structuralist paradigm. In the  Order of Things especially, Foucault explicates
historical  documents  on  the  basis  of  discourse,  the  object  of  archaeology.  This  methodology  is
elaborated at  length in the  Archaeology of  Knowledge.  Much like the historian of  science Thomas
Kuhn,  Foucault  showed that  different  time periods  operated according to  the rules  of  a  dominant
discourse. What is accepted as true or false in different epochs, varies accordingly to that episteme's
truth-games. Foucault substantiates these claims in The Order of Things by comparing the production
of knowledge within Renaissance, Classical, and Modern epistemic periods. The geographical method
for this sort of investigation is Foucault's habitation in the historical archives of France. In the archives,
one does archaeology, which will uncover the strangeness of truth-conditions in a time other than our
own. 
As mentioned in my introduction, Foucault posited that the modern discourse was constituted
by the 'Analytic  of  Finitude'  as  inaugurated by Kant,  a  paradigm that  perceives  'Man'  as  both the
constructor  of  knowledge  and an object  of knowledge.  A question left  unanswered by Foucault  is
whether a postmodern discourse has arrived or if the 20th century still thinks in the shadow of 'Man.' In
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the 1960s, Foucault seemed to be introducing the new discourse of a new epoch under the banner of
structuralism. According to these tenets, the being of man and the being of language are inversely
related, so when theorists of semiotics and literature started to abound in France, Foucault interpreted
the trend as a shift in the tide long overdue that signaled the 'death of Man.' But Foucault does not
entertain the idea of being the spokesperson for a new structuralist discourse for very long.
In  the  1970s,  Foucault  shifts  methodologies,  not  only  by  distancing  himself  against
structuralism, but by inventing a new method for historical analysis known as  genealogy. Genealogy
turns from discourse to power as the condition of truth. Some commentators conjecture that Foucault
switches allegiances because he realizes the methodological inadequacies of archaeology, mainly that it
presumed the autonomy of  discourse  apart  from social  context.33 Others  think that  Foucault  never
officially  abandons  archaeology,  but  rather  complements  it  with  another  method:  whereas  early
Foucault concentrated on discursive practices as a historian of philosophy, later Foucault focuses on
non-discursive practices, in a way more akin to a social theorist. I prefer the later reading of the relation
between  archaeology  and  genealogy  that  engages  them  through  a  hermeneutical  circle:  discourse
determines the rules of institutional truth and practice, while institutions condition the discourse that
they protect and partake. Neither power nor discourse can be isolated in an originary place without the
other.  This  reciprocity  of  power  and  knowledge—nicknamed  'power-knowledge'—constitutes
individuals as subjects, persons who perceive their self according to discursive modes of subjugation.
In  Foucault's  main genealogical  works,  he describes  how different  kinds  of  modern subjects  were
formed, conditioned, and objectified by institutions and their apparatuses of power, be it discourse,
space, surveillance, etc. For instance, in  Discipline and Punish, Foucault traces the 'the birth of the
prison' and how punitive discourses constructed a whole architecture placing subjectified-criminals not
33 Dreyfus and Rabinow, pp. xxiv-xxv.
Lamb 19
only as physical prisoners but also as immoral selves with a responsible 'soul.'34  
In  my  section  on  poststructuralist  social  theory  I  will  explicate  Foucault's  nominalistic
conception of power. Undoubtedly, Foucault's early methods, archaeology, were not as sociologically-
minded  as  his  later  writings,  geneaology.  One  of  the  main  contributions  Foucault  makes  to
contemporary social theory is his critical thought and tool, 'power.' Is not to do sociology the same as
performing diagnostics on complex power relations in the present, as an 'ontology of the present'—
social  theory  as  'historical  ontology'  as  Foucault  suggests?  The  displacement  of  'ontology'  from
metaphysics  is  an  intentional  philosophical  statement  in  itself.  Power  analysis  is  conceptually
advantageous because it provides a model for understanding its researchable manifestations as social
objects, such as norms, identity, institutions. As I will discuss in my later section, Foucault's idea of
power is not limited to wholesale oppression, but also includes  productivity, visible and invisible.
Reception by Social Theorists
To substantiate many of my claims about Foucault's usefulness and propriety to sociology, I
only need to refer to how many sociologists have already appropriated Foucault. Hitherto, I have not
tried to split 'sociologists' from 'social theorists' because Foucault's methodology could be practiced by
any so-interested and inclined sociologist. But now I turn more intentionally to several contemporary
social theorists renown for their reputation within the international academy, theorists whose writings
reconcile  the  sociology-philosophy divide,  a  Foucaultian  project  I  entertained  earlier.  First,  I  will
examine the commentary of Anthony Giddens on Foucault, both in his specialized work and in an
introductory textbook he co-authored. Then I will turn to a few other social theorists, such as Georges
Ritzer, Zygmunt Bauman, and David Lyons. The objective of this section is to briefly mention other
social theorists who confirm my thesis and to list what specific examples they give of Foucault's impact
34 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1977, p. 24.
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upon the domain.
Quite  noticeably,  a  few of  Foucault's  books  are  considered  classics  by  now among  social
theorists, while others are almost completely ignored. Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality
Volume  1:  An  Introduction are  Foucault's  two  seminal  texts  in  the  estimation  of  social  theorists.
Anthony Giddens proves this trend, hailing  Discipline and Punish as Foucault's “most brilliant, the
focus of most of what he had to say of importance about power.”35 Giddens also elevates 'power' as the
quintessential conceptual contribution made by Foucault to social theory. Offering a definition of how
Foucault uses the term, Giddens writes, “Power was actually the means whereby all things happened,
the production of things, of knowledge and forms of discourse, and of pleasure.”36 Since the same
conception of power animates Foucault's first volume of the History of Sexuality, it is no surprise social
theorists are attracted to that work as well. 
In addition to power, Giddens thinks that Foucault has offered sociologists several other critical
concepts as well: i. Architecture – how space itself, as it is constructed and laid out, manifests social
patterns such as hierarchy and control.37 ii. Social technology – Giddens defines this as “any kind of
regular intervention we make into the functioning of our bodies,  in order to alter  them in specific
ways.”38 'Technology' and 'technique' are ubiquitous concepts in Foucault's vocabulary and they can
usually be translated simply as the various means and instruments used by institutions or individuals to
constitute and control  subjects,  including the relation of  self  to self.  iii.  Theory of  Organization –
Giddens  also  calls  this  'administrative  power.'  This  notion  in  particular  is  featured  in  Giddens's
Introduction to Sociology textbook, in which he associates Foucault with the theory that institutions
control time and space through techniques like surveillance, time-tables, and information.39 On this last
35 Giddens, Politics, Sociology and Social Theory, p. 263.
36  Ibid. p. 263.
37 This has special affinities with another contemporary social theorists: David Harvey on geography.
38 Giddens, Introduction to Sociology, p. 571.
39 Ibid., pp. 153-4.
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notion, Giddens praises Foucault for making “perhaps the most important contribution to the theory of
administrative power since Max Weber's classic text on bureaucracy.”40 The comparison and contrast
between Weber and Foucault  is  often touched on by social  theorists.  Similar  to Weber's  notion of
bureaucratic rationality, Foucault analyzes modern forms of organizational power. The main difference
between the two social philosophers is that Weber's vision of rationality totalizes society—society is a
cage—but Foucault maps the power of domination more like an archipelago of islands in the sea of
civil  society, i.e.  there are places  where repressive power is  totalizing,  but  there are many places,
perhaps even within the same society, where pleasure and peace is not domination-based though still
conditioned by power.41
Zygmunt Bauman, a Polish sociologist living in exile in England, also finds Foucault to be a
resourceful ally. Unlike Giddens though, Bauman is not persuaded that Foucault's theory of power as
organizational domination is his best contribution. Rather, Bauman dwells in Foucault's first volume of
The History of Sexuality, focusing on several reconceptualizations of sexuality that Foucault proposes
there. In this work, Foucault debunks the popular liberal repressive-hypothesis that urges humans to
free  their  desires  from  the  social  constraints  fettering  them.42 The  libertine  and  the  conservative
Victorian have this fundamental truth in common: the perception of sex as a special object. Foucault
questions the very social fact that constitutes sex as the intimate, secret center of desire and truth in a
subject. By this critique, coming from a standpoint that recommends 'desexualization,' Foucault finds
himself at odds with both Christians and psychoanalysts. In Volume 1 of  The History of Sexuality,
Foucault outlines a future project that will accomplish a genealogy of modern sexuality, exposing the
contingency of the trenary structure of sex, truth, and desire. Foucault roughly sketches the specifics in
the first volume, making some quite controversial claims. First, Foucault traces this gestalt of sexual
40 Giddens, Politics, pp. 264-5.
41 'Archipelagos' of incarceration, as opposed to systemic rationalization, should probably be credited to George Ritzer and
his way of wording it.
42 Foucault, History of Sexuality: An Introduction, 1978, p. 10.
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experience to the Christian practice of confession, in which individuals were to disclose their secret
sexual  immoralities  to  an  authority.  The  gradual  problematization  and  epistemic  result  was  a
hermeneutic that constituted the modern self as a “desiring man.” Second, Foucault seeks to uncover a
historical connection between pastoral power, as performed through the visibilizing ritual of penance,
to the modern state  police power,  both as instruments of population-wide surveillance and control.
Clearly the scope of the genealogy of sexuality impacts a lot of territory for the social theorist,  as
Bauman  indicates.  Bauman  also  wishes  to  employ  Foucault's  methods  to  critique  the  modern
patriarchy-derived  social  configuration  of  the  nuclear  family,  exposing  the  contingency  of  its
contemporary formation.43 
Perhaps a spectrum of reactions to Foucault by social theorists can be plotted, from those who
embrace  him to  those who avoid  him.  Georges  Ritzer  and Charles  Lemert  both hope  to  integrate
Foucault's theory with contemporary social theory.44 Not necessarily agreeing with Foucault on many
points, Ritzer thinks Foucault's  whole oeuvre, early and later,  is  relevant to sociology. In  his book
Postmodern Social  Theory,  Ritzer  summarizes and discusses  at  length all  of  Foucault  books,  from
archaeology to genealogy and even some of Foucault's later ethical writings.45 Like Ritzer, David Lyon
does  not  disregard  Foucault's  early  methods  of  discourse  analysis  in  its  potential  contribution  to
sociology.  In  his  book  Postmodernity,  Lyon  explicitly draws parallels  between  the  implications  of
Foucault's  work and Thomas Kuhn's  Structure of  Scientific Revolutions.46 Both Kuhn and Foucault
describe the history of science not as a line of advancement through more accurate representations of
the world, but as a series of paradigm shifts (though Foucault may be more skeptical than Kuhn about
the 'reality' of scientific truth-games). Despite the parallel, Foucault's work in a sense comes closer to
challenging sociology directly since Kuhn specializes in the hard sciences while Foucault addresses the
43 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents, 1997, p. 144. 
44 For Charles Lemert, see his Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression, 1982.
45 Georges Ritzer, Postmodern Social Theory, 1997.
46 David Lyon, Postmodernity, 1994, p. 67.
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'human sciences' in The Order of Things. 
David  Lyon  makes  another  theoretical  parallel  between  Foucault  and  the  famous  German
sociologist  and critical  philosopher Jürgen Habermas,  a parallel  often and popularly noted.  Writing
within the framework of modern critical philosophy, they both reject the dominant Hegelian form of
history centered on a sovereign subject and the dual subject-object character of 'Man.' Structuralism has
denounced and decentered that Kantian paradigm, in and turn, generated a rising knowledge of the
'being of language' for Foucault,  or of 'communication' according to Habermas's  lexicon. As social
theorists, Foucault and Habermas offer acute critiques of modern institutions, political and economic,
as extensions of the rationalizing power of domination. However, their conceptions of power quickly
part paths after that initial agreement. Since I delineate the similarity of these two thinkers in relation to
social theory, I will comment at length on their theoretical differences.
Foucault and Habermas
Most of the continental debate between Foucault and Habermas, as contemporaries, has been
facilitated by their  American colleagues,  and unfortunately,  they have  been  pressured  into  making
remarks about the other that betray their mutual misunderstandings. Foucault calls Habermas's attempt
to continue the project of modernity through undistorted consensual communication rather utopian.47
Conversely, Habermas dismisses Foucault's theory of power as being metaphysical in a Nietzschean
sense that inevitably leads to anti-humanistic skepticism. These are both gross and overused stereotypes
they are promoting about the other. However, Habermas expands a more nuanced critique of Foucault
in his later work: i. Foucault is trapped in the same paradox of self-reference that he refutes elsewhere;
ii.  Foucault's  fundamental  idea  of  power  is  essentially  a  matter  of  control  and  determinism;  iii.
Foucault's  genealogies  pretend  to  be  value-free,  but  in  doing  so,  they lose  a  necessary normative
47 “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Foucault, Ethics, p. 298.
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standpoint for the act of social criticism.48 
This critique abides in several misreadings of Foucault, though Habermas's third critique shows
a true difference between the two thinkers. First, accusing Foucault of a 'paradox of self-reference' is
misleading since for Foucault the 'self' is not the transcendental-empirical doublet of a bygone era.
Moreover Foucault's  paradox concerns  the contemporary discourse about discourse:  what  episteme
conditions  Foucault's  historical  analysis  of  other  epistemes?  But  this  is  a  problematic  explicitly
embraced  by  Foucault  in  his  discussion  of  the  difficulties  in  doing  an  ontology  of  the  present.
Furthermore, as I proposed in my introduction, this is a problematic that positively characterizes the
critical thought Foucault finds in Kant. What Habermas forgets is that Foucault is as much a Kantian as
a Nietzschean. 
Secondly, orienting himself on the possibility of an ideal speech situation, Habermas predictably
finds Foucault as an aid for charting 'communication pathologies.' Habermas's goal is to remove the
political obstacles that may interfere with pragmatic and communal reasoning. But Habermas limits
Foucault as a theorist of pathology who defines power solely as that which distorts communication. Of
course, many distinctions of types of power need be noted, as Habermas notes, but he nevertheless
targets Foucault for a generalized metaphysic of power as domination. As we will see more in my next
section, Foucault also differentiates between types of power (e.g. 'domination' vs. 'governance'), and
does not think that power and freedom are mutually exclusive in the way Habermas does.49 Power-
relations condition all knowledge, for later Foucault, and power structures a field of possibilities that
includes freedom and resistance. Hence, Foucault considers Habermas's objective of sterilized, power-
neutral conversation to be impossible. Foucault accuses Habermas of committing the “failure to see
that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that we have to break free of.”50
48 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 128-129.
49 David Ingram, “Foucault and Habermas,” In the Cambridge Companion to Foucault, p. 262.
50 Foucault, Ethics, p. 298., emphasis mine.
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Lastly,  Habermas's  third  critique  is  more  than  a  misunderstanding;  it  is  a  valid,  perhaps
irreconcilable  difference  between  them.  Habermas,  among  many other  critics  like  Richard  Rorty,
wonders about the apparent impersonality of Foucault's text. Foucault's archaeologies and genealogies
seem to lack a standpoint, a place from where the force of his criticism is issued. From a sociological
point of view, this accusation would indeed be condemning of Foucault if he did not take into account
his own situatedness. Yet, Foucault is more complex and more aware of this problem than Habermas
claims. Indeed, it would not be a stretch to call Foucault an advanced standpoint theorist in regards to
his  comparative  methodology.  As  mentioned  already,  Foucault's  methods  of  social  analysis  work
through comparing and contrasting the past with the present, precisely to expose the prejudices of the
present, rather than assume with theorists that we already begin with an unproblematic identity. “But
the problem,” Foucault states in an interview rebutting Rorty's critique, “is to decide if it is actually
suitable to place oneself within a 'we' in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one
accepts...because it seems to me that the 'we' must not be previous to the question; it can only be the
result—and the necessarily temporary result—of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which
one formulates it.”51 However, the second part of Habermas's critique here is still not resolved. Can a
social theorist be critical of a regime without some sort of normative grounding, which Habermas finds
in  the  Enlightenment  vision  of  a  universal  human  community.  Foucault  consistently  attacks  such
humanism as excluding more than it includes (in respect to the mad, the criminal, and the sexually
abnormal).52 Whereas  Habermas  needs  the category of  the  universal  to  legitimate  social  criticism,
Foucault is content to perform the activity as a conditioned, relative practice of truth-telling.
Despite some irreconcilable differences, 'final Foucault' was heavily influenced by Habermas,
as evidenced in his interviews from the 1980s.53 Foucault especially appropriated Habermas's theory of
51 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” In Ethics, p. 115.
52 Ingram, p. 241.
53 I will briefly discuss this distinction between 'later Foucault' and 'final Foucault' in more depth below. 
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knowledge interests, first proposed by Habermas in his book, Knowledge and Human Interests in 1968.
In  his  sociology  of  knowledge,  Habermas  distinguishes  between  three  types  of  social-actions  or
techniques. Each one of these has a respective domain of knowledge: i. work or production conditions
instrumental  reasoning,  used  in  the  empirical  sciences  as  well;  ii.  interaction  or  communication
conditions  history  and  hermeneutics;  iii.  domination conditions  the  opposition  of  oppression  and
emancipatory theory. In his appropriation of this quasi-transcendental schemata, Foucault defines the
techniques  as  “three types  of  relationships  which  in  fact  always  overlap one another,  support  one
another  reciprocally,  and use each other  mutually as  means to an end.”54 Foucault  here is  slightly
adapting Habermas's conception of the techniques so that they accord with his own theory of power.
Basically, each type of social-action represents a pattern of power-relations for Foucault. Rather than
reduce power to domination, Foucault uses Habermas to expand and specify the constitutive functions
of  power  in  its  holistic  differentiation  that  encompasses  all  knowledge.  In  this  context,  Foucault
provides the underlining principle of play governing the scheme of technology of power. And in the last
section of my thesis, I will explain how Foucault supplements Habermas's theory by adding a crucial
fourth technique.
The  vital  question  for  us  is  how this  conceptual  architecture,  this  typology  of  techniques,
impacts the science of sociology as a form of knowledge, but also how the future of social theory can
live up to the importance Foucault and Habermas both grant it. In Habermasian terms, the cognitive
interest of sociology is power, oppression, and violence, the third type of social action. In this case,
sociology as a field of knowledge can be recognized as Habermas's idealized 'emancipatory theory.'
Yet,  even  more  primordially,  they both accede over  a  certain  primacy to  social  theory when  they
describe the functions of social-action or power in producing knowledge. The 'stuff' of sociology is not
only a field of knowledge in itself, but the condition of all knowledge. Contemporary critical theory can
54 Ingram, p. 260, but originally in “the Subject and Power,” in Foucault's Power, 2000.
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be thought of as a social rendition of the Kantian transcendental analytic, the complex of categories that
conditions  our  perception  of  the  world.  However,  whereas  Kant  grounded  the  categories  in  the
transcendental  subject,  Foucault  locates  them in  power  and  discourse,  within  the  sphere  of  social
concepts.  
This is not a retrogression to social positivism, to calculable objects or social facts. Techniques
are not  to be understood atomistically.  Rather,  as  Foucault  intended and indicated,  they frame the
structural  possibilities  of  social-action.  Every institution  or  school  of  thought  can  be  plotted  as  a
configuration  of  power-relations,  a  diversity  and  total  of  its  specific  social-actions.  In  Foucault's
estimations, the techniques are much more than cognitive interests. They are the permutations of power
that produce the possibility of all social consciousness and all social practice. Nor is this a regression
to any overly rationalistic account of society. The missing key that Foucault provides is the association
between  power and  play in a Deleuzian sense.  Foucault's  assessment  of the productivity of power
implies  that  power  is  compatible  with  chance  and  discontinuity,  irreducible  intelligibilities  and
incorporealities, and freedom and even social  responsibility.55 At this intersection, I will turn to an
evaluation of Foucault's thought through the rubric (or ruse) of poststructuralist social theory. 
III. Foucault's 'Poststructuralist' Social Theory
Poststructuralism is  a  much more tenuous term than structuralism. A theoretical  account  of
structuralism can detect  several  theoretical  tenets that  cohere the inter-disciplinary movement.  This
cannot be said of poststructuralism. However, the neologism is not vacuous despite its ambiguity. If
one interprets it literally, poststructuralism is simply what occurred in French intellectual thinking after
structuralism waned. Current historians of the rise and decline of structuralism hail Foucault's  The
Order of Things in 1966 as the zenith of the movement before its popularity rapidly fell. The loss of
55 Some philosophers would term this “dialectical materialism.”
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interest is aptly captured by the mantra during the student revolts around France in 1968: “Structures
don't take to the streets!”56 By 1970s, Foucault refused the label structuralist, claiming he had never
been a structuralist despite some minor methodological similarities. George Ritzer's comment perfectly
describes this shifting Foucault: “The poststructuralists are generally embedded in structuralism at the
same time that they are trying to distance themselves from it.”57 In summary, poststructuralism is not a
unified group of adherents; rather, it is a retrospective term that attempts to represent the creativity or
circumlocutions  of  heterogeneous  French  critical  theorists  who,  though  steeped  in  structuralism,
continue to disown it. Under its banner, many famous intellectuals are thrown, often inaccurately or
against their will: Jacques Derrida who coined the literary methods known as deconstruction to expose
inconsistencies  in  texts;  Roland  Barthes  who  gradually  shifted  in  his  self-description  from  a
structuralist  to  a  semiologist;  Julia  Kristeva  who  wreaked  havoc  on  Lacanian  structuralist
psychoanalysis; Jean-Francois Lyotard who explored the notion of a pre-discursive event. Most of these
writers took an active part in a philosophical literary journal in France titled Tel Quel, named after the
Nietzschean insight: “as it is.” A cursory search for some sort of common ground among this cohort
might touch on these features: i. a rejection of the closure of structuralist synchrony that had led to a
conception of language as a totality in the moment; ii. the return of several topics or themes vehemently
dismissed  by  earlier  structuralists,  such  as:  history,  hermeneutics,  religion,  and  the  subject;  iii.  a
rejection  of  anthropological  constants  as  explicated  by  the  structuralist  Levi-Strauss—the  settled
contours of 'systems' i.e. binary or trenary oppositions, are destabilized further by poststructuralists; iv.
the preference for semiological surfaces rather than mechanistic depths; and lastly  v. the growing or
resurging interest in the possibility of a non-discursive event or experience. 
I  will  examine  Foucault's  poststructuralist  maneuvers  for  some  clues  about  what  the
56 Some die-hards, such as Jacques Lacan re-asserted, indeed structures do take to the streets!
57 Ritzer, p. 33.
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implications  for  social  theory  may  be.  Foucault's  later  thought  does  manifest  several  of  the
poststructuralist characteristics listed above. For our purposes, I will focus on how Foucault theorizes
about  an  extra-discursive  reality,  the  power-relations  that  condition  discourse,  and  how  Foucault
resurrects the 'subject' or 'self' after its death and disappearance during the short reign of structuralism.
Social theorists should take special interest in these two topics: power and the subject, as they are key
sociological concepts and objects. A Foucaultian social theory can be considered poststructuralist due
to several innovations that distinguish it from other modern social theory: i. its non-positivist historicist
relativism (in contrast to structuralism's alleged ahistoricism);  ii. the compatibility it welds between
structural power and social agency, due to the principle of play; iii. a new conception of the body as a
pre-discursive site  to  be marked and penetrated by power;  iv.  for plotting a  way to  sociologically
analyze ethics and the subject that is neither existentially ego-centric nor deterministic. On this last
venture consists Foucault's intimated addition to Habermas: a fourth basic technique of power. 
Power: Towards a Positive Reappraisal.
A large portion of Foucault's intercollegiate efforts during the last decade of his life were merely
spent  on  correcting  misconceptions  of  power  that  unintentionally  resulted  from his  work.  In  one
interview, he bluntly says, “The idea that power is a system of domination that controls everything and
leaves  no room for  freedom  cannot  be attributed to  me.”58 In  this  section,  I  will  try to  pin  down
Foucault's definition of power in order to appropriate it as a usable social concept of analysis. 
Both Giddens and Habermas can be indicted for spreading some stereotypes about Foucault.
Giddens  accuses  Foucault  of  seducing social  theory to  the  nihilism of  Nietzsche.  While  Foucault
indeed hails Nietzsche as his most important influence, the way many commentators understand their
relation is  quite  naïve.  In  this narrative,  Nietzsche invents the cosmic principle called the “will  to
58 Foucault, Ethics, p. 293, emphasis mine.
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power,” and Foucault later affirms it non-critically as the basis for all knowledge and human society.
But this account lacks a recognition of the social complexity that Foucault represents through power
analysis. 'Power' is never singular for Foucault, but rather it denotes a specific set of power-relations. In
one sense, this is a continuation of Nietzsche's philosophical inversion of relations and activity over
substance and essentialist metaphysics. Giddens's targeting of Foucault's 'power' as an essentialist idea,
as a “mysterious phenomenon” is mistaken. Foucault instructs that “one needs to be nominalistic, no
doubt.”59 Furthermore, especially in his final years, there are numerous times when Foucault is not the
faithful Nietzschean, but instead can be quite critical of Nietzsche.60 One of the easiest differences to
note between them is Foucault's identification of power and freedom, and his positing of freedom as the
basis of ethics.61  
This  leads  to  another  misconception  that  Giddens  promotes:  the  frequent  allegation  that
Foucault's theory of power necessarily implies determinism. Perhaps this would be the case if Foucault
was solely a theorist of 'total domination.' In contrast though, Foucault often writes that totalitarianism
is only one configuration of power-relations, the one which does exclude various liberties, but even that
the totalitarian state is merely one terminal and temporary end of the multitude of political possibilities
of power-relations. As discussed above, some distinctions within the term 'power' can greatly abate this
confusion.  Foucault  states,  “There  are  three  levels  to  my  analysis  of  power:  strategic  relations,
techniques of government, and states of domination.”62 Each of the three units listed here is extremely
comprehensive in the social patterns it refers to. 'Governance' could mean a form of representative-
democracy or it could denote a family arrangement of patriarchal authority. 'Strategic relations' comes
close  to  a  synonym for  power.  In  this  same passage,  Foucault  defines  power  as  “games  between
59 Foucault, History of Sexuality: Volume 1, p. 93.
60 For one example, see Foucault, Ethics, p. 275.
61 Of course, though Nietzsche is a determinist, he still grants a moral creativity to the ubermensch, but not to subjects in
general.
62 Foucault, Ethics, p. 299.
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liberties—in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their
conduct to be controlled or try to control the conduct of the others.”63 Since Foucault is simplifying his
theory for an interview, we should be sure not to misunderstand 'control' as a psychological concept
—'control'  in  Foucault's  sense  is  fundamental  to  all  social  relations  and  a  quasi-transcendental
condition of any intelligibility. 
It  is very informative in itself  that  Foucault's  most famous discussion of power occurs in a
section entitled 'Method' in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. This indicates that power is, for
Foucault, the supreme critical tool of doing historical sociology, or in this case, the genealogy Foucault
outlines on modern sexual practices. This passage from  The History of Sexuality is well-known for
consecutively setting aside several popular misunderstandings of power. Power is not a possession held
by  rulers,  nor  a  quality  of  their  strength.  Rather,  it  is  an  interplay  “exercised  from  innumerable
points.”64 It  is  a  name for  situational  strategies  or  tactics.  Power  is  not  'outside'  or  'above'  social
relations,  but  rather  'immanent'  to  them,  i.e. power  is social  relations,  and  more  primordially,  the
condition  of  their  possibility.  Like  a  structuralist  would,  Foucault  still  claims  that  power  is
“nonsubjective.”65 If  power-relations  are  meaningful,  hermeneutically,  it  is  because  they are  finely
calculated: “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives.”66 And lastly,
power should not be confused with determinism. Power is instead the play of freedoms, practiced by
individuals  and  institutions—without  freedom,  there  would  be  no  power.  In  the  diction  of  social
activism, absorbed by Foucault, this freedom translates as “resistance.” Wherever there is power, there
is resistance, its immanent and imminent antagonism. 
Foucault's  theory  of  power  is  radical  and  disturbing  due  to  its  inversion  of  the  dominant
63 Ibid.
64 Foucault, History of Sexuality: Volume 1, p. 94.
65 Ibid., p. 95.
66 Ibid.
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conception of power as negative and repressive. The type of thought that Foucault severely prosecutes
occurs especially in romantic liberalism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Both schools of thought presume
a  juridical-discursive  model  of  power,  ultimately  derived  from  the  modernist  political  theory  of
sovereignty.  This  current  of  liberalism  resurfaces  in  opinion  about  sexuality  today  through  the
“repressive hypothesis,” the popular idea that sex is repressed by law and religion, and that human
desire should be freed. Though the psychoanalytic picture is much more complicated, the Law of the
Father (the master signifier, social symbolic authority) is still repressive, the big Other to the desires of
the id. In contrast to all these legal-metaphors and desire-discourses, Foucault offers a new picture of
power as positive and productive. In his characterizations above, 'power' includes the possibility of
social action through its structurations, intelligible or not.67 Quoted at length, Foucault defines power as
the:
“multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute
their own organization;  as the  process  which,  through ceaseless struggles and confrontations,
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one
another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions
which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose
general  design  or  institutional  crystallization  is  embodied  in  the  state  apparatus,  in  the
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.”68 
Power is not equated with the force of the law, because the law and the tyrant is only one manifestation
and expression of productive power—hegemony is the possibility of power losing its productivity and
solidifying  into  a  state  of  domination  that  decreases  the  potential  of  resistance.  Obviously,  this
complicates  and  overturns  the  repressive-hypothesis  which,  according  to  Foucault,  still  obeys  the
Western injunction to speak about sex in relation to truth, a confessional problematization, as opposed
to not speaking about it all (which is different from being silent about it—another advanced form of
speaking).  In  his  evaluation  of  the  repressive-hypothesis,  Foucault  states  that  power-relations  are
internal in the production of discourse and that discourse often deceives its subjects of enunciation. The
67 I use Gidden's term 'structuration' intentionally to suggest that Giddens is not as different from Foucault as he claims.
68 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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first point is poststructuralist,  while the second point is vintage structuralism: on the hermeneutical
level, one can speak meaningfully, but erroneously in relation to the level of system and constitutive
causality. For instance, the sexual libertine projects his or her frustration upon the law, without realizing
the causal source of frustration is another problematic, contingently sedimented through history.   
Another genealogy Foucault performs deserves the appreciation of modern sociologists. Like a
social theorist, Foucault asks what type of power is dominant in the contemporary world. He answers
with the notion of 'bio-power.' Many current political theorists have heavily adopted Foucault's analysis
of bio-power as a new cornerstone to contemporary critical theory, especially Giorgio Agamben and
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. These latter intellectuals employ the concept to analyze the tactics of
the modern nation-state as a bureaucracy of efficiency, management, and war.
Bio-politics  emerged  as  a  new  form  of  power  in  the  seventeenth  century.  Traces  of  this
genealogy can be found in Foucault's book Birth of the Clinic, but mostly in his courses at the College
de France. The transformations in medical perception occurred analogously and simultaneously to a
shift in how political power was maintained by states. In pre-modern societies, power over a populus
was enforced through the  punitive threat  of  death,  whether  in  war  or  penal,  public  executions.  In
contrast, modern political power turned from punishment and discipline  through death to regulation
over life. Citizens thus became constituted as a variable but maintainable 'population,' subjugated in life
to surveillance and conscription. The problematicization of 'public heath' hence became an instrument
of power,  including “utilized controls to regulate births, mortality,  level  of health,  and so on.”69 In
summary, the bio-political management of life established a whole new field of objects, e.g. the body,
sexual practice, biographical information and privacy, as tactical targets of state governmentality.
A profound irony in Foucault's  intellectual progression is how, during Foucault's  courses on
biopolitics and governmentality, after the publication of the first volume of  The History of Sexuality,
69 Ritzer, p. 67.
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Foucault  becomes an enthusiast  of political  and economic liberalism. Not only ironic,  but  perhaps
shocking to many of his fans or critics who had accused him of a dark neo-conservatism in the name of
Nietzsche. Yet Foucault's interest in modern liberal governmentalities makes sense when the political
phenomenon is conceived as some sort of advance in the complexity of power-relations, mainly that a
state can rule its citizens without centralized control.70 Foucault's preferred variant of liberalism has
little to do with classical Rousseau-inspired romanticism. It is closer to the neoliberalism advocated by
British and American economists. In fact, economics receives higher and higher praises from Foucault
as an atheistic type of knowledge of relations without an absolute totality or sovereign point of view.71
The attraction of neoliberalism lies in its economic critique of strong centralized state power: liberalism
argues for a set of power-relations without a controlling center, for a government that 'lets go' of the
regulation of the periphery's  independent life-processes. This description of liberalism has much in
common  with  Habermas's  later  works  that  defend  civil  society  and  communication  from  the
colonization of  the “life-world”  by a  collusion of  state  and market  forces.  For  both Foucault  and
Habermas, liberalism is a form of governmentality implementing a calculated letting-be.72
Even more surprising, Foucault becomes a positive spokesperson for religion and spirituality in
some of his later writings.  This new horizon happens in the context of the Iranian Revolution and
Foucault's  observations as  a  journalist  when he traveled to  Iran.  Achieving a realistic  appraisal  of
religion in a way Marx never did, Foucault begins to see spiritual  communities and practices as a
potential force for resistance against domination. Unlike many of his French contemporaries though,
Foucault was never a devoted adherent to Marxism or communism, so perhaps he was more open-
minded to a non-Marxist sociology of religion. 
70 See Colin Gordon's “Introduction” in Power for more on how this topic of research fits with Foucault's oeuvre.
71 Paras.
72 I am indebted to Eric Paras's account of these intellectual shifts, especially in relation to liberalism. See his more
popular, but no less credible Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power/Knowledge.
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After the interpreted failure of the student revolts in 1968, as well as the fatal devolutions of
Stalinism  and  Maoism,  many disillusioned  intellectuals  struggled  to  come  to  terms  with  a  'post-
revolutionary'  globe.  Known as  the  nouveaux philosophes (or  the new philosophers),  they became
skeptics  of  grand  theory,  master  narratives,  and  Hegelian  dialectics.  Foucault's  name  was  often
associated with them, including Andre Glucksmann and Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. These new movements
in French political thought also led to the period of bitter and silent strife between Michel Foucault and
Gilles Deleuze due to the latter's continued defense of revolutionary violence. 
Part  of  Foucault's  surprise as  a  new philosopher,  was a  return to  the 'subject'  though fully
renovated from the aftermath of structuralism. The conception of the 'individual' in liberalism became a
source of Foucault's philosophical preoccupations, and he eventually saw it and the body, as a site of
resistance,  as a partially self-constituting subjectivity.73 Due to such shifts  in thought,  many of the
critiques of Giddens and Habermas are irrelevant for another reason: not  taking into account  final
Foucault.
On the other hand, we should not be surprised with Foucault's changes. After all, he had warned
us from the 1960s that he would not obey the rules of the unity of the author, including the confinement
to one methodology and platform throughout one's life. Foucault self-describes his transformations as a
certain 'curiosity,' almost like a stubborn open-mindedness. His momentary interlude with liberalism
soon  became  the  vanishing  mediator  between  his  focus  on  modernity  and  his  eventual  study  of
antiquity, the setting of the second two volumes of The History of Sexuality. The practice of the self he
discovers  there,  our  much  anticipated fourth  technique,  has  very few resonances  in  neoliberalism.
Though  launched  into  Greco-Roman  history  through  the  expansion  of  his  genealogy  of  modern
sexuality, the culture and philosophy of antiquity became the raw material for many of Foucault's most
impressive and most neglected theories—theories of the self, ethics, and spirituality. The complexity of
73 Ibid. p. 79-80.
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Foucault's intellectual biography has led me to chart his life chronologically into three stages—early,
later,  and final—in accordance with several  other commentaries.74 In  the next and last  section,  we
evaluate final Foucault as a poststructuralist social theorist of the self. 
The Ethical Self
In his introduction to a collection of writings on ethics by Michel Foucault, Paul Rabinow, one
of Foucault's finest commentators, observes the irony of Foucault's legacy: “Foucault himself argued in
The Order of Things that there could be no moral system in modernity, if by 'moral system' one meant a
philosophical anthropology that produced firm foundations concerning the nature of Man and, thereby,
a basis for human action. Ultimately, though, Foucault may well be remembered as one of the major
ethical  thinkers  of  modernity.”75 True to Rabinow's  words,  as  a  late-blooming ethicist,  Foucault  is
enormously creative,  elucidating ancient  texts  on morality  vis-a-vis the moral  problematizations  of
modernity. In Foucault's longest-spanning genealogy, he traces the separation between philosophy and
spirituality in Western civilization, uncovering the moral ethos of ancient and premodern societies in a
nearly  nostalgic  way.  Two  ethical  injunctions  in  Greco-Roman  culture  complemented  each  other
indivisibly: i. Take care of the self; ii. Know thy self. Partly due to high Christian theology, and partly
due to Cartesianism, the second imperative, know thy self, became detached from the care of the self,
slowly resulting  in  an  identification  of  valid  knowledge  with  the  external  world,  isolated  from a
practice the self as a form capable of transformation,  that is, from any recognition of spirituality as
procedure  of  truth. In  a  nutshell,  Foucault's  theory defines  ethics as  the  practice  of  the  self,  and
spirituality as the self-governed transformation of the self. 
Alas we are approaching the final arena of Foucault's social theory on ethical subjectivity. At
74 Hence the title of James Bernauer and David Rasmussen's edited Final Foucault, 1988.
75 Foucault, Ethics, p. xxvi.
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first, Foucault seems to adopt a common philosophical definition of the self, Kierkegaardian to be more
precise: the ways the self relates to the self. These 'ways,' or practices are the fourth technique, the
technology of the self, which Foucault feels necessarily to add to Habermas's typology of social-action.
This addition manifests a new focus in Foucault's thought: the freedom of the thinking individual to
transform oneself and through truth and virtue, to stand apart from wider society, much as the first
philosophers did in Greco-Roman antiquity. Thus, the activity of the self is not reducible to the other
societal mechanisms represented in the Habermasian tripartite technology: production, communication,
domination. Governance of the self by the self is another form of power Foucault teaches us to take
seriously in itself: 
It seems, according to some suggestions of Jürgen Habermas, that one can distinguish three major
types of technique: the techniques that permit one to produce, to transform, to manipulate things;
the techniques that permit one to use sign systems; and finally, the techniques that permit one to
determine the conduct of individuals, to impose certain ends or objectives...But I became more
and more aware that in all societies there is another type of technique: techniques that permit
individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their bodies, their
own souls,  their  own thoughts,  their  own conduct,  and  this  in  a  manner  so as  to  transform
themselves,  modify themselves,  and to  attain  a  certain state  of  perfection,  happiness,  purity,
supernatural power. Let us call these technique 'technologies of the self.'76
He describes the Greco-Roman practice as askesis, a form of training at self-improvement, in contrast
to  later  Christian  asceticism,  which  converges  with  the  notion  of  renunciation.  Askesis is  an
individualized  exercise  of  self-creation  and  self-stylization,  embodying  and  expressing  the  nobler
values one aspires for teleologically to a 'state of perfection.'77 However, Foucault uses the term 'telos'
unsuggestively,  keeping  it  open  to  the  relativity  of  its  meaning  among different  cultures  or  even
different individuals. As opposed to Habermas's universal pragmatics, Foucault's ethics are more akin
to  Rorty's  'private  self-sublimation,'  for  both  Foucault  and  Rorty  think  modernity's  universalizing
tendencies in ethical discourse are self-defeatingly to the detriment of humanity's moral improvement.
Before  Foucault's  ethical  turn  is  dismissed  as  irrelevant  to  social  analysis,  it  should  be
76 Foucault, Ethics, p. 177.
77 This is more Nietzschean than Wesleyian.
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remembered that Foucault posits the practice of the self as a basic type of power arrangements. The
significance for social  theory is  a new understanding of ethics that  exceeds the typical  analysis of
mores  and  moralities,  how  morality  is  merely  the  product  of  socialization  upon  individuals  by
institutional norms. Foucault plots a social theory within the self—the self is a complex set of relations
and technologies. Against other non-Kierkegaardian metaphysical definitions of the self that posit the
subject as a substance, an essentialist identity, Foucault argues that the self is not one, or that the self is
not self-same, so to speak:
What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted itself, in one specific form or
another, as a mad or a healthy subject, as a delinquent or nondelinquent subject, through certain
practices that were also games of truth, practices of power, and so on....[the subject] is not a
substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself...one plays, one
establishes a different type of relationship to oneself. And it is precisely the historical constitution
of these various forms of the subject in relation to the games of truth which interests me.”78
By challenging the stable identity of the self, Foucault locates the self as a nexus of social dynamism.
Once again,  we are reminded of  Kierkegaard who,  in his  aesthetics,  so  persuasively describes  the
human  habit  of  donning  masks.  The  self  chooses  among  possibilities  of  many  potential  selves,
continuously through  life,  in  repeated  but  not  determined  patterns.  In  some sense,  this  'choice'  is
originary for Foucault:  “freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered
form that  freedom takes  when  it  is  informed  by  reflection.”79 Intentionally  conflating  ethics  with
personal aesthetics, Foucault exposits the ethical agency of the self in a non-reductive way, that is,
irreducible to a science of the self as an object—as the modern human sciences do. In the passage
quoted above, Foucault demonstrates the sociological interests at stake in understanding the practice of
the self,  namely how the individual  constitution of the subject  is  still  historically influenced, as to
whether  one is  defined as  insane,  criminal,  etc.  Such subjectivations exemplify Foucault's  remark,
quoted above, on the constant overlapping between the four techniques.
78 Ibid., p. 290. 
79 Ibid., p. 284.
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Judith Butler, a feminist philosopher and frequent follower of Foucault, shares my interpretation
on the relevance of Foucault's theory of the subject for sociology. In discussion of Foucault, she writes,
“when the 'I' seeks to give an account of itself, an account that must include the conditions of its own
emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, become a social theorist.”80 In her recent book Giving An
Account of Oneself, she compares final Foucault with Nietzsche on the process of subject formation.
For Nietzsche, self-reflexivity emerges from the threat of legal punishment, which produces the 'bad
conscience'—like early Foucault here, the ethical self is an effect of power-relations. But final Foucault
examines  the subject  in  a new way,  i.e. as  partially self-constituting.  In  contrast  to Nietzsche,  the
reflexivity of  the  subject  now emerges  when one  aesthetically and ethically relates  oneself  to  the
established truths of one's context and its codes of conducts. Thus there is a distance, an 'opening'
between the self and institutions or discourse, a space that enables the ethical posture of critique. Butler
writes, Foucault “insists that the relation to the self is a social and public relation, one that is inevitably
sustained in the context of norms that regulate reflexive relations.”81 The freedom of the self consists in
its capacity to challenge these quasi-transcendental regulatory norms.82 For this, Foucault envisions as a
radical  self-questioning,  happening  in  full  awareness  of  the  subject's  opacity  to  itself  due  to  its
grounding in a complex social formation. The logical tension here is between a disciplined self, which
is subjectified by social norms, and the ethical self, which intentionally resists those norms, or at least,
is not reducible to them.
In some of his final interviews, Foucault seems to be providing a new self-description of his
oeuvre in its entirety. For one who formerly refused to consign a methodological coherence to his work,
he now offers an extremely useful hermeneutical key for processing all his writings: they are studies in
subjectivity, what the subject experiences (as mad), how a body is subjectified (as a criminal), and how
80 Judith Butler, Giving An Account of Oneself, 2005, p. 8. For the concentration on the subject as an effect of power, see
Butler's The Psychic Life of Power, 1997.
81 Ibid., p. 114.
82 'Quasi-transcendental' here is nearly synonymous with the category of social conditions.
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a subject can relate to its self (as an ethical individual). Largely due to the influence of Habermas,
Foucault becomes capable of giving his writings a comprehensive topology, though the interpretive key
is Foucault's unique contribution to ethical theory: the practice of the subject. Foucault subdivides his
work according to  three  interrelated 'axes'  of  subjectivity that  overlap  with  the four  techniques  of
power:
Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to
truth  through  which  we  constitute  ourselves  as  subjects  of  knowledge;  second,  a  historical
ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as
subjects  acting on  others;  third,  a  historical  ontology in  relation to ethics  through which we
constitute ourselves as moral agents.83
Each domain corresponds to a period of publication in Foucault's life: i. subjects of knowledge applies
to History of Madness and The Order of Things; ii. subjects acting on others corresponds to Discipline
and Punishment and the first volume of the History of Sexuality; iii. subjects constituting ourselves as
moral agents includes final Foucault's interviews and latter two volumes in the History of Sexuality. In
a Habermasian topology, subjects of knowledge overlaps with the first two techniques (instrumental
reasoning  and  communication);  the  second  historical  ontology  concerns  questions  of  power  and
domination;  and  lastly,  ethics  is  Foucault's  principal  addition  to  the  Habermasian  scheme:  the
technology of the subject. Thus, the two terms that bridge Foucault's oeuvre are i. forms of subjectivity;
and ii. 'historical ontology.'
Methodologically, this second category of analysis should be conceived both genealogically and
archaeologically. Historical ontology is the study of how power-relations in the past continue to affect
the present and how they constitute subjectivities in contingent configuration, while enabling subjects
to practice ethics and resistance for a destabilization of immobile power-relations. According to the
common academic  categorization  of  things,  historical  ontology agrees  well  with  the  concerns  and
methods of social theory. I have shown how Michel Foucault presents a viable poststructuralist social
83 Ibid., p. 262.
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theory for the future of both critical philosophy and sociological research.
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